Appendix

A.1 Additional Regression Results

This section reports the raw regression results that were used to generate the margins tables in the main text, as well as alternative specifications for some regressions.

Section 6.1 of the main text corresponds to Tables 1-4 here. Specifically, Table 1 here shows the raw regression results behind Table 7 in the main text (effect of the increase/decrease factors on the amount of power subjects bought in the Power Games). Table 2 here shows the raw regression results behind Table 8 in the main text (effect of power type on the difference between positive discretion and negative discretion bought). Table 3 here shows the raw regression results behind Table 9 in the main text (effect of which Power Game the observation came from on the amount of power subjects bought). Finally, Table 4 here shows the raw regression results behind Table 10 in the main text (effect of information treatment assignment on the amount of power subjects bought), as well as two additional specifications: columns (2) and (4) were used for the main text; columns (1) and (3) are the alternative specifications.

Section 6.2 of the main text corresponds to Tables 5-8 here. Table 5 here shows the raw regression results behind Table 12 in the main text (effect of information treatment assignment on the outcomes subjects chose for their partners), as well as two additional specifications: columns (2) and (4) were used for the main text; columns (1) and (3) are the alternative specifications. Tables 6 and 7 here shows alternative regressions for the Monetary Game and Points Game, respectively, in Table 13 of the main text (effect of personal characteristics on outcome chosen for one's partner). Table 8 here shows the raw regression results behind Table 15 in the main text (effect of power type on the unused proportion of bought discretion).

Section 6.3 of the main text corresponds to Tables 9-11 here. Table 9 shows the raw regression results behind Table 16 of the main text (effect of power type on the amount subjects spend on power). Tables 10 and 11 here shows alternative regressions for the Monetary Game and Points Game, respectively, in Table 19 of the main text (effect of personal characteristics on amount subjects spend on power).

Table 1: Estimates of the Effect of Increase/Decrease Factors on Amount of Power Bought

	(1) Monetary Game	(2) Points Game
Increase factor	1.588*** (0.138)	1.263*** (0.143)
Decrease factor	1.004*** (0.079)	0.819*** (0.119)
Power type:		
Malevolent	0.591 (0.245)	0.363 (0.214)
Capricious	0.554*** (0.158)	0.467* (0.163)
Selfish	0.768*** (0.166)	0.507** (0.149)
Malevolent × increase factor	-0.684 (0.251)	-0.461 (0.257)
Capricious × increase factor	-0.249 (0.171)	-0.079 (0.179)
Selfish × increase factor	-1.380*** (0.161)	-1.007*** (0.174)
Malevolent × decrease factor	0.481 (0.240)	0.181 (0.302)
Capricious × decrease factor	0.256 (0.122)	0.260 (0.160)
Selfish × decrease factor	-0.786*** (0.117)	-0.618*** (0.139)
Round number	0.013 (0.015)	0.024 (0.015)
Points Game first	-0.351 (0.139)	0.323 (0.168)
Information treatment:		
Low information	0.091 (0.164)	0.157 (0.206)
Control	0.174 (0.177)	0.348 (0.217)
Constant	-0.980*** (0.205)	-1.147*** (0.223)
Observations	2013	2013
Adjusted R^2	0.618	0.481
Mean power bought	1.572	1.445

Note: The coefficients are from linear regressions. Each subject-round constitutes one observation. Standard errors (clustered at the subject-level) are in parentheses. Reference categories: benevolent (power type), high information (information treatment).
Significance level: * $p < 0.00625$, ** $p < 0.003125$, *** $p < 0.000625$.

Table 2: Estimates of Positive Discretion in Excess of Negative Discretion ($)

	(1) Monetary Game	(2) Points Game
Malevolent	-0.349*** (0.058)	-0.188* (0.064)
Capricious	-0.142*** (0.039)	-0.098 (0.041)
Selfish	-0.167*** (0.033)	-0.112** (0.035)
Round number	-0.001 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)
Points Game first	-0.041 (0.027)	-0.011 (0.030)
Information treatment:		
Low information	-0.005 (0.031)	-0.002 (0.034)
Control	0.002 (0.033)	-0.014 (0.039)
Constant	0.201*** (0.058)	0.086 (0.060)
Observations	2013	2013
Adjusted R^2	0.007	0.001
Mean excess discretion	0.043	0.048

Note: The coefficients are from linear regressions. Each subject-round constitutes one observation. Standard errors (clustered at the subject-level) are in parentheses. Reference categories: benevolent (power type), high information (information treatment).
Significance level: * $p < 0.00625$, ** $p < 0.003125$, *** $p < 0.000625$.

Table 3: Estimates of the Relationship Between Power Bought and Game Played

	(1)	(2)
Points Game round	-0.450 (0.230)	-0.450 (0.231)
Power type:		
Malevolent	0.481 (0.429)	0.481 (0.429)
Capricious	0.614 (0.263)	0.614 (0.263)
Selfish	-1.701*** (0.217)	-1.701*** (0.217)
Points Game round × malevolent	-1.028 (0.618)	-1.028 (0.618)
Points Game round × capricious	-0.022 (0.289)	-0.022 (0.289)
Points Game round × selfish	0.458 (0.260)	0.458 (0.261)
Points Game first	-0.397 (0.274)	-0.397 (0.274)
Points Game round × Points Game first	0.532 (0.290)	0.532 (0.290)
Malevolent × Points Game first	-0.235 (0.600)	-0.235 (0.600)
Capricious × Points Game first	-0.103 (0.370)	-0.103 (0.370)
Selfish × Points Game first	0.473 (0.301)	0.473 (0.301)
Points Game round × malevolent × Points Game first	1.594 (0.714)	1.594 (0.714)
Points Game round × capricious × Points Game first	0.163 (0.360)	0.163 (0.360)
Points Game round × selfish × Points Game first	-0.345 (0.384)	-0.345 (0.384)
Round number	0.034 (0.016)	0.022 (0.012)
Information treatment:		
Low information	0.121 (0.160)	0.121 (0.161)
Control	0.241 (0.174)	0.241 (0.174)
Increase factor		1.024*** (0.063)
Decrease factor		0.879*** (0.055)
Constant	1.532*** (0.260)	-0.342 (0.263)
Observations	4026	4026
Adjusted R^2	0.060	0.474
Mean power bought	1.509	1.509

Note: The coefficients are from linear regressions. Each subject-round constitutes one observation. Standard errors (clustered at the subject-level) are in parentheses. Column (1) does not control for the increase/decrease factors, while column (2) does. Column (2) is the specification used in the paper. Reference categories: Points Game round (whether the observation came from the Points Game or Monetary Game) benevolent (power type), Points Game first (game order), high information (information treatment).
Significance level: * $p < 0.0125$, ** $p < 0.00625$, *** $p < 0.00125$.

Table 4: Estimates of the Relationship Between Power Bought and Information Treatment

	(1) Monetary Game	(2) Monetary Game	(3) Points Game	(4) Points Game
Info treatment:				
Low info	0.017 (0.221)	-0.066 (0.364)	0.046 (0.237)	-0.353 (0.450)
Control	0.252 (0.228)	-0.022 (0.348)	0.355 (0.240)	0.113 (0.430)
Power type:				
Malevolent		0.503 (0.472)		-0.474 (0.825)
Capricious		0.314 (0.344)		0.180 (0.411)
Selfish		-1.535*** (0.312)		-1.127 (0.420)
Low info × malevolent		-0.454 (0.641)		0.418 (0.959)
Low info × capricious		0.359 (0.465)		1.034 (0.552)
Low info × selfish		0.189 (0.402)		0.250 (0.542)
Control × malevolent		0.252 (0.712)		1.143 (0.988)
Control × capricious		0.378 (0.466)		0.459 (0.558)
Control × selfish		-0.035 (0.385)		-0.429 (0.499)
Increase factor		1.099*** (0.073)		0.950*** (0.072)
Decrease factor		0.966*** (0.061)		0.792*** (0.068)
Round number		0.018 (0.016)		0.022 (0.016)
Points Game first		-0.365 (0.138)		0.298 (0.164)
Constant	1.484*** (0.158)	-0.336 (0.314)	1.313*** (0.162)	-0.538 (0.379)
Observations	2013	2013	2013	2013
Adjusted R^2	0.000	0.527	0.002	0.423
Mean power bought	1.572	1.572	1.445	1.445

Note: The coefficients are from linear regressions. Each subject-round constitutes one observation. Standard errors (clustered at the subject-level) are in parentheses. Columns (2) and (4) are the specifications used in the paper. Reference categories: high information (info treatment), benevolent (power type).
Significance level: * $p < 0.00625$, ** $p < 0.003125$, *** $p < 0.000625$.

Table 5: Estimates of the Relationship Between Outcome Chosen and Information Treatment

	(1) Monetary Game	(2) Monetary Game	(3) Points Game	(4) Points Game
Info treatment:				
Low info	-0.110 (0.140)	-0.126 (0.212)	0.121 (0.140)	-0.193 (0.260)
Control	0.055 (0.155)	0.047 (0.199)	0.005 (0.157)	-0.125 (0.264)
Power type:				
Malevolent		-2.099*** (0.187)		-1.133 (0.471)
Capricious		-0.535 (0.220)		-0.648 (0.238)
Selfish		-0.795*** (0.171)		-0.499 (0.234)
Control × malevolent		-0.072 (0.344)		-0.330 (0.589)
Control × capricious		0.122 (0.307)		0.351 (0.373)
Control × selfish		-0.086 (0.210)		0.046 (0.303)
Low info × malevolent		0.419 (0.330)		0.443 (0.535)
Low info × capricious		0.191 (0.308)		0.736 (0.366)
Low info × selfish		0.159 (0.227)		0.136 (0.305)
Increase factor		0.705*** (0.057)		0.538*** (0.056)
Decrease factor		-0.172*** (0.048)		-0.315*** (0.051)
Round number		0.012 (0.012)		0.016 (0.010)
Points Game first		-0.038 (0.091)		0.016 (0.114)
Constant	0.328** (0.100)	0.276 (0.193)	0.147 (0.099)	0.287 (0.231)
Observations	2013	2013	2013	2013
Adjusted R^2	0.000	0.250	0.000	0.118
Mean outcome chosen	0.309	0.309	0.189	0.189

Note: The coefficients are from linear regressions. Each subject-round constitutes one observation. Standard errors (clustered at the subject-level) are in parentheses. Reference categories: benevolent (power type), high information (information treatment).
Significance level: * $p < 0.00625$, ** $p < 0.003125$, *** $p < 0.000625$.

Table 6: Estimates of the Relationship between Monetary Game Outcome and Personal Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Risk aversion	0.014 (0.062)	-0.018 (0.061)	0.005 (0.058)	-0.014 (0.059)
Extraversion	0.014 (0.028)	0.011 (0.028)	0.009 (0.027)	0.004 (0.027)
Agreeableness	0.055 (0.033)	0.049 (0.036)	0.043 (0.034)	0.040 (0.036)
Conscientiousness	-0.019 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.033)	-0.024 (0.031)	-0.037 (0.033)
Neuroticism	0.010 (0.026)	0.003 (0.027)	0.027 (0.028)	0.015 (0.028)
Openness	0.088 (0.037)	0.082 (0.037)	0.078 (0.036)	0.082 (0.037)
Authoritarianism	0.005 (0.029)	0.006 (0.030)	0.014 (0.033)	0.017 (0.034)
Religiosity			-0.098 (0.064)	-0.079 (0.065)
Prior lab experience			-0.135 (0.128)	-0.069 (0.132)
Female			-0.162 (0.127)	-0.133 (0.126)
LGBT+			0.203 (0.189)	0.181 (0.198)
Race:				
Black			0.089 (0.270)	-0.022 (0.319)
Asian			-0.013 (0.156)	-0.011 (0.167)
American Indian			1.315*** (0.303)	1.287** (0.370)
Hispanic			-0.037 (0.202)	0.056 (0.192)
Other			-0.253 (0.237)	-0.275 (0.239)
Political affiliation:				
Republican			0.252 (0.174)	0.229 (0.177)
Independent			0.114 (0.152)	0.030 (0.158)
Other			0.062 (0.158)	0.035 (0.166)
Field of study:				
Science			-0.360 (0.175)	-0.331 (0.172)
Social science			-0.324 (0.249)	-0.240 (0.284)
Arts			0.718 (0.355)	0.742 (0.368)
Engineering			-0.241 (0.163)	-0.257 (0.158)
Other			-0.088 (0.251)	-0.048 (0.259)
Monthly spending			-0.047 (0.071)	-0.031 (0.071)
Increase factor		0.705*** (0.057)		0.705*** (0.058)
Decrease factor		-0.172** (0.048)		-0.172** (0.048)
Round number		0.012 (0.012)		0.012 (0.012)
Points Game first		0.015 (0.126)		0.048 (0.129)
Info treatment:				
Low info		-0.076 (0.139)		-0.040 (0.137)
Control		0.053 (0.152)		0.056 (0.144)
Constant	-0.460 (0.380)	-0.829 (0.424)	-0.108 (0.399)	-0.639 (0.449)
Observations	2123	2013	2123	2013
Adjusted R^2	0.007	0.165	0.028	0.185
Mean dep. var.	0.307	0.309	0.307	0.309

Note: The coefficients are from linear regressions. Each subject-round constitutes one observation. Standard errors (clustered at the subject-level) are in parentheses. Reference categories: White (race), Democrat (political affiliation), business (field of study), high information (info treatment).
Significance level: * $p < 0.002$, ** $p < 0.001$, *** $p < 0.0002$.

Table 7: Estimates of the Relationship between Points Game Outcome and Personal Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Risk aversion	-0.005 (0.066)	-0.016 (0.069)	-0.000 (0.061)	-0.012 (0.065)
Extraversion	0.009 (0.030)	0.005 (0.030)	0.001 (0.029)	-0.004 (0.030)
Agreeableness	0.040 (0.033)	0.046 (0.035)	0.043 (0.034)	0.046 (0.037)
Conscientiousness	0.000 (0.035)	-0.002 (0.036)	0.007 (0.034)	0.006 (0.037)
Neuroticism	0.027 (0.026)	0.021 (0.027)	-0.000 (0.029)	0.002 (0.029)
Openness	0.089 (0.030)	0.086 (0.032)	0.078 (0.031)	0.081 (0.032)
Authoritarianism	0.044 (0.028)	0.045 (0.030)	0.089 (0.032)	0.089 (0.034)
Religiosity			-0.120 (0.068)	-0.105 (0.073)
Prior lab experience			-0.052 (0.110)	-0.017 (0.116)
Female			0.230 (0.136)	0.190 (0.131)
LGBT+			0.263 (0.133)	0.251 (0.143)
Race:				
Black			-0.124 (0.184)	-0.201 (0.194)
Asian			0.055 (0.147)	0.087 (0.156)
American Indian			1.615*** (0.300)	1.663*** (0.258)
Hispanic			-0.059 (0.201)	-0.010 (0.203)
Other			-0.297 (0.243)	-0.310 (0.253)
Political affiliation:				
Republican			0.103 (0.181)	0.103 (0.184)
Independent			0.184 (0.132)	0.187 (0.146)
Other			0.033 (0.199)	0.019 (0.200)
Field of study:				
Science			-0.109 (0.142)	-0.073 (0.146)
Social science			-0.228 (0.234)	-0.204 (0.237)
Arts			1.001* (0.306)	0.987* (0.295)
Engineering			0.240 (0.195)	0.173 (0.206)
Other			0.390 (0.310)	0.474 (0.309)
Monthly spending			-0.011 (0.071)	-0.044 (0.079)
Increase factor		0.538*** (0.056)		0.538*** (0.056)
Decrease factor		-0.315*** (0.051)		-0.315*** (0.052)
Round number		0.016 (0.010)		0.016 (0.010)
Points Game first		0.061 (0.128)		0.031 (0.128)
Info treatment:				
Low info		0.157 (0.142)		0.191 (0.144)
Control		0.004 (0.155)		0.017 (0.150)
Constant	-0.749 (0.375)	-1.080 (0.446)	-0.790 (0.358)	-1.184 (0.465)
Observations	2123	2013	2123	2013
Adjusted R^2	0.008	0.087	0.038	0.118
Mean dep. var.	0.174	0.189	0.174	0.189

Note: The coefficients are from linear regressions. Each subject-round constitutes one observation. Standard errors (clustered at the subject-level) are in parentheses. Reference categories: White (race), Democrat (political affiliation), business (field of study), high information (info treatment).
Significance level: * $p < 0.002$, ** $p < 0.001$, *** $p < 0.0002$.

Table 8: Estimates of the Relationship between Unused Discretion and Power Type

	(1) Monetary Game	(2) Points Game
Malevolent	0.536 (0.401)	0.714 (0.344)
Capricious	0.697 (0.295)	0.596 (0.255)
Selfish	-1.222 (0.985)	0.492 (0.534)
Increase factor	-0.386*** (0.108)	-0.382*** (0.096)
Decrease factor	-0.115 (0.105)	-0.029 (0.092)
Round number	-0.013 (0.020)	0.002 (0.019)
Points Game first	0.319 (0.208)	0.360 (0.211)
Information treatment:		
Low information	-0.099 (0.251)	-0.156 (0.241)
Control	-0.097 (0.248)	0.061 (0.259)
Constant	-1.143*** (0.315)	-1.231*** (0.292)
Observations	973	900
Mean fraction unused discretion	0.237	0.266

Note: The coefficients are from fractional logit regressions. The dependent variable is the proportion of unused discretion. Each subject-round constitutes one observation; rounds in which the subject did not buy power are excluded. Standard errors (clustered at the subject-level) are in parentheses. Reference categories: benevolent (power type), high information (information treatment).
Significance level: * $p < 0.016667$, ** $p < 0.008333$, *** $p < 0.001667$.

Table 9: Estimates of the Relationship between Amount Spent on Power and Power Type

	(1) Monetary Game	(2) Points Game
Malevolent	0.339 (0.206)	-0.218 (0.189)
Capricious	0.427** (0.127)	0.348 (0.152)
Selfish	-0.592*** (0.104)	-0.501*** (0.117)
Points Game first	-0.201 (0.127)	0.011 (0.145)
Malevolent × Points Game first	-0.103 (0.242)	0.671** (0.231)
Capricious × Points Game first	-0.063 (0.173)	0.050 (0.195)
Selfish × Points Game first	0.207 (0.129)	0.120 (0.169)
Increase factor	0.122*** (0.020)	0.105*** (0.018)
Decrease factor	0.034 (0.017)	0.005 (0.018)
Round number	0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)
Information treatment:		
Low information	0.052 (0.075)	0.076 (0.088)
Control	0.069 (0.078)	0.063 (0.090)
Constant	0.412** (0.129)	0.390** (0.131)
Observations	2013	2013
Adjusted R^2	0.276	0.199
Mean spending	0.596	0.586

Note: The coefficients are from linear regressions. Each subject-round constitutes one observation. Standard errors (clustered at the subject-level) are in parentheses. Reference categories: benevolent (power type), high information (information treatment).
Significance level: * $p < 0.008333$, ** $p < 0.004167$, *** $p < 0.000833$.

Table 10: Estimates of the Relationship between Monetary Game Spending and Personal Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Risk aversion	0.029 (0.035)	0.043 (0.035)	0.024 (0.032)	0.042 (0.033)
Extraversion	0.023 (0.018)	0.022 (0.018)	0.023 (0.018)	0.023 (0.017)
Agreeableness	0.068 (0.022)	0.070 (0.023)	0.058 (0.021)	0.056 (0.021)
Conscientiousness	0.026 (0.021)	0.032 (0.022)	0.038 (0.022)	0.042 (0.024)
Neuroticism	0.027 (0.017)	0.022 (0.017)	0.038 (0.020)	0.030 (0.018)
Openness	0.080*** (0.021)	0.069** (0.020)	0.086*** (0.022)	0.079** (0.022)
Authoritarianism	0.056 (0.018)	0.055 (0.018)	0.051 (0.021)	0.045 (0.021)
Religiosity			-0.023 (0.048)	-0.021 (0.047)
Prior lab experience			0.013 (0.079)	-0.005 (0.079)
Female			-0.040 (0.090)	-0.045 (0.086)
LGBT+			-0.063 (0.118)	-0.173 (0.105)
Race:				
Black			0.064 (0.199)	0.109 (0.196)
Asian			0.080 (0.114)	0.095 (0.114)
American Indian			1.293*** (0.160)	1.422*** (0.216)
Hispanic			0.310 (0.099)	0.270 (0.093)
Other			-0.044 (0.145)	0.004 (0.146)
Political affiliation:				
Republican			0.176 (0.117)	0.193 (0.114)
Independent			-0.050 (0.095)	-0.043 (0.088)
Other			0.159 (0.135)	0.149 (0.142)
Field of study:				
Science			-0.028 (0.097)	-0.063 (0.094)
Social science			0.052 (0.164)	0.006 (0.195)
Arts			0.308 (0.128)	0.393 (0.139)
Engineering			-0.368* (0.112)	-0.305 (0.110)
Other			-0.072 (0.177)	-0.028 (0.156)
Monthly spending			-0.069 (0.042)	-0.097 (0.043)
Increase factor		0.122*** (0.020)		0.122*** (0.020)
Decrease factor		0.034 (0.017)		0.034 (0.017)
Round number		0.002 (0.004)		0.002 (0.004)
Points Game first		-0.241* (0.074)		-0.188 (0.074)
Info treatment:				
Low info		0.081 (0.092)		0.136 (0.089)
Control		0.107 (0.089)		0.133 (0.091)
Constant	-0.746 (0.252)	-0.867* (0.274)	-0.827 (0.301)	-0.950 (0.344)
Observations	2123	2013	2123	2013
Adjusted R^2	0.076	0.149	0.141	0.218
Mean dep. var.	0.601	0.596	0.601	0.596

Note: The coefficients are from linear regressions. Each subject-round constitutes one observation. Standard errors (clustered at the subject-level) are in parentheses. Reference categories: White (race), Democrat (political affiliation), business (field of study), high information (info treatment).
Significance level: * $p < 0.002$, ** $p < 0.001$, *** $p < 0.0002$.

Table 11: Estimates of the Relationship between Points Game Spending and Personal Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Risk aversion	-0.032 (0.040)	-0.020 (0.041)	-0.026 (0.038)	-0.018 (0.039)
Extraversion	0.017 (0.019)	0.018 (0.019)	0.007 (0.020)	0.011 (0.020)
Agreeableness	0.065 (0.023)	0.057 (0.026)	0.053 (0.023)	0.043 (0.024)
Conscientiousness	-0.003 (0.023)	0.006 (0.024)	-0.005 (0.024)	0.008 (0.025)
Neuroticism	0.029 (0.017)	0.024 (0.017)	0.029 (0.021)	0.026 (0.021)
Openness	0.037 (0.021)	0.041 (0.022)	0.034 (0.024)	0.046 (0.025)
Authoritarianism	0.056 (0.020)	0.061 (0.021)	0.048 (0.023)	0.049 (0.025)
Religiosity			-0.012 (0.051)	-0.010 (0.053)
Prior lab experience			-0.090 (0.084)	-0.084 (0.090)
Female			-0.000 (0.101)	-0.019 (0.101)
LGBT+			-0.110 (0.122)	-0.143 (0.140)
Race:				
Black			-0.013 (0.128)	-0.035 (0.134)
Asian			0.013 (0.118)	0.066 (0.126)
American Indian			0.963*** (0.122)	1.070*** (0.126)
Hispanic			0.305 (0.128)	0.286 (0.126)
Other			0.167 (0.157)	0.137 (0.168)
Political affiliation:				
Republican			0.075 (0.123)	0.110 (0.126)
Independent			-0.048 (0.102)	-0.085 (0.104)
Other			0.026 (0.148)	0.053 (0.156)
Field of study:				
Science			-0.121 (0.096)	-0.139 (0.101)
Social science			0.017 (0.174)	-0.029 (0.184)
Arts			0.313 (0.213)	0.330 (0.210)
Engineering			-0.213 (0.165)	-0.230 (0.167)
Other			0.293 (0.231)	0.290 (0.237)
Monthly spending			-0.010 (0.046)	-0.022 (0.052)
Increase factor		0.105*** (0.018)		0.105*** (0.018)
Decrease factor		0.005 (0.018)		0.005 (0.018)
Round number		-0.003 (0.004)		-0.003 (0.004)
Points Game first		0.075 (0.085)		0.085 (0.086)
Info treatment:				
Low info		0.060 (0.105)		0.105 (0.109)
Control		0.082 (0.101)		0.091 (0.106)
Constant	-0.188 (0.251)	-0.438 (0.282)	-0.022 (0.292)	-0.334 (0.354)
Observations	2123	2013	2123	2013
Adjusted R^2	0.045	0.072	0.084	0.118
Mean dep. var.	0.593	0.586	0.593	0.586

Note: The coefficients are from linear regressions. Each subject-round constitutes one observation. Standard errors (clustered at the subject-level) are in parentheses. Reference categories: White (race), Democrat (political affiliation), business (field of study), high information (info treatment).
Significance level: * $p < 0.002$, ** $p < 0.001$, *** $p < 0.0002$.

A.2 Instructions[1]

This study is in 4 Parts. In each Part you will participate in several Rounds. Only one Part will be chosen for payment and only one Round in that Part will count towards payment. In addition to what you will earn in the study, you will get a $5 show-up fee. No one will be allowed to leave until at least 45 minutes have passed, so it is in your interest to take your time on each decision.

After you have completed the 4 Parts of this study, you will be able to see your total earnings on your screen, as well as the number of points you have. Your points will not affect your earnings. Your points are determined by the same Round of the same Part that determines your payment.

We will now hand out a paper copy of the instructions for Part 1 of the study. The instructions will also be displayed on the computer before the part begins. We will give you the instructions for the subsequent Part after you have completed the current part (e.g., you will receive instructions for Part 3 once you have completed Part 2). If you have questions at any point, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to you.

Before each part begins, you will be given a quiz to test your understanding of the instructions. You will need to get all the questions right before you can proceed.

[1]For the first seven sessions, subjects were handed physical instructions at the beginning of each part, which were kept until the end of the experiment. Since multiple treatments were conducted in the same session, to improve efficiency and reduce the likelihood of mixing up handouts, in the remaining 12 sessions, instructions were instead displayed on-screen at the beginning of each part. In these sessions, an abbreviated version (i.e., excluding the examples for Parts 2-4 and not mentioning the Practice Round) was shown at the bottom of the screen for the duration of the associated quiz and part. When subjects reached the survey questions beginning with "What motivated your choices in Part...", the instructions for all previous parts were available at the bottom of the screen.

PART 1

In this Part of the study, you will make decisions over the course of 5 Rounds. In each Round, you will be asked to choose between two options that determine your payment. Below we list the exact 5 decision problems that you will face. Both the decision problem and the options may appear in a different order on your screen than what is indicated below.

In each of these Rounds, you will have the choice between a fixed amount or letting the computer choose your outcome. If you let the computer choose, it will randomly pick either $4.30 *or* $20.30, with equal probability.

The List of Choices in Part 1

Decision Problem	Option 1		Option 2
1	Fixed amount of $4.30	Versus	Let the computer choose either $4.30 or $20.30
2	Fixed amount of $8.30	Versus	Let the computer choose either $4.30 or $20.30
3	Fixed amount of $10.30	Versus	Let the computer choose either $4.30 or $20.30
4	Fixed amount of $12.30	Versus	Let the computer choose either $4.30 or $20.30
5	Fixed amount of $14.30	Versus	Let the computer choose either $4.30 or $20.30

PREAMBLE TO THE REST OF THE STUDY[2]

For the rest of this study, you will be randomly matched with a person who participates in a later session. There is nothing that anyone else can do that will affect your payment, but your decisions affect both your payment and the payment of the person you are matched with.

You will not know who you are matched with. The person you are matched with has been given instructions for a different experiment, and what they do in that experiment will not affect their earnings. **Your decision will entirely determine their payment.**

The Part and Round which counts for payment will be the same for you and the person you are matched with. Note that if a Round from Part 1 is chosen for payment, then the person you are matched with will earn $12.30, regardless of your decision in that Round.

["Recognition" treatment continues:]

> At the end of the experiment, the person you are matched with will be told their final earnings, that those earnings were influenced by another person in a previous session, and the choices you made in the Round that counted for payment. To understand the choices you made, they will be given a copy of the instructions you received for the entire study. **They will not know that you are the person they are matched with.**

["No recognition" treatment instead continues:]

> At the end of the experiment, the person you are matched with will be told their final earnings and that those earnings were influenced by another person in a previous session, but not how the earnings were determined. **They will not know that you are the one they were matched with, the options you faced, nor the choices you made.**

[2]Version shown in the "Recognition" or "No recognition" treatment.

PREAMBLE TO THE REST OF THE STUDY[3]

For the rest of this study, you will be randomly matched with a person participating in this session. Either you or the person you are matched with will be randomly selected to determine the payment for both of you. If you are selected, your decisions will entirely determine both your earnings and the earnings of the person you are matched with. Further, if you are selected, then there is nothing that anyone else can do that will affect your payment. If you are not selected, your decisions will not affect your payment or anyone else's.

You will not know who you are matched with. The Part and Round which counts for payment will be the same for you and the person you are matched with. Note that if a Round from Part 1 is chosen for payment, then the person who is not selected to determine payment will earn $12.30, regardless of anyone's decision in that Round.

You will not know whether you are selected or not, so it is in your interest to make your decisions as if you were selected. Thus, for the remainder of the instructions, we will assume that you were selected.

[3]Version shown in the control treatment.

PART 2[4]

In this Part of the study, you will make decisions over the course of 11 Rounds. In each Round, you will be given $12.30 and can pay up to $2 (in an increment of 5 cents) for the ability to choose the payment for the person you are matched with. If you pay more than $0, you can change the payment of the person you are matched with by the Round's multiplier times the amount you pay (in an increment of 5 cents).

In some rounds, you can choose to either raise or lower the other person's payment. In other rounds, you will only be able to raise, or only be able to lower, their payment. This will be indicated to you before you choose how much to pay.

You are free to not change the other person's earnings, regardless of whether you pay or not. If you do not change the other person's payment, then their payment will be $12.30.

For example, suppose the multiplier is 4, and it is a Round where you can both raise or lower the other person's payment.

- First, you choose how much to pay for the ability to change the other person's earnings. You can pay any amount between $0 and $2.
- Suppose you choose to pay $1.50. The multiplier turns this into $1.50 * 4 = $6. Then you can raise or lower the other person's earnings by up to $6 (in an increment of 5 cents). Since the other person starts with $12.30, that means you can choose their earnings to be any amount between $6.30 and $18.30.
- Suppose you choose $14 as the other person's earnings. If this Round is chosen for payment, then you will earn $12.30 – $1.50 = $10.80 and the person you are matched with will earn $14.

[If the subject does Part 2 before Part 3, it continues:]

> Before we start the 11 Rounds, we will show you two screens in a "Practice Round" so that you can familiarize yourselves with the interface. The first screen will be an example of a screen in which you decide how much to pay for the ability to choose the payment for the person you are matched with. The second screen is where you would choose the payment for the person you are matched with, if you paid more than $0. Note that in the Practice Round only, you will see the second screen regardless of whether you pay $0. The Practice Round does not count towards payment.

[4] "PART 2" and "PART 3" were done in reverse order for half of the subjects. For such subjects, this part was labeled "PART 3."

PART 3[5]

In this Part of the study, you will make decisions over the course of 11 Rounds. You can choose to pay a certain amount of money to obtain the ability to choose the points of the person you are matched with. **These points do not affect the other person's earnings.** You will see how many points you have at the end of the experiment, and the person you are matched with will see how many points they have at the end of their session.

In each round, you will be given $12.30 and can pay up to $2 for the ability to choose the points for the person you are matched with. If you pay more than $0, you can change the points of the person you are matched with by the Round's multiplier times the amount you pay (in an increment of 5 cents).

In some rounds, you can choose to either raise or lower the other player's points. In other rounds, you will only be able to raise, or only be able to lower, their points. This will be indicated to you before you choose how much to pay.

You are free to not change the other person's points, regardless of whether you pay or not. If you do not change the other person's points, then their points will be 12.30.

If this Part is chosen for payment, then the person you are matched with will earn $12.30 regardless of what you choose. If this Part is not chosen for payment, then the person you are matched with will earn 12.30 points regardless of what you choose. In either case, you will earn 12.30 points.

For example, suppose the multiplier is 4, and it is a Round where you can both raise or lower the other person's points.

- First, you choose how much to pay for the ability to change the other person's points. You can pay any amount between $0 and $2.
- Suppose you choose to pay $1.50. The multiplier turns this into 1.5 * 4 = 6. Then you can raise or lower the other person's points by up to 6 (in an increment of 0.05). Since the other person starts with 12.30 points, that means you can choose their points to be any amount between 6.30 and 18.30.
- Suppose you choose 14 as the other person's points. If this Round is chosen for payment, then you will earn $12.30 – $1.50 = $10.80 and 12.30 points. The person you are matched with will earn $12.30 and 14 points.

[If the subject does Part 3 before Part 2, it continues:]

> Before we start the 11 Rounds, we will show you two screens in a "Practice Round" so that you can familiarize yourselves with the interface. The first screen will be an example of a screen in

[5] "PART 2" and "PART 3" were done in reverse order for half of the subjects. For such subjects, this part was labeled "PART 2."

which you decide how much to pay for the ability to choose the points for the person you are matched with. The second screen is where you would choose the points for the person you are matched with, if you paid more than $0. Note that in the Practice Round only, you will see the second screen regardless of whether you pay $0. The Practice Round does not count towards payment.

PART 4

In each Round of this Part of the study, you will be asked to choose between two options that determine payment for both you and the person you are matched with. Here is an example of such a choice:



Suppose Part 4 and this Round was chosen for payment. If you choose the pair on the left, you will earn $14.80 and the person you are matched with will earn $9.60. If you choose the pair on the right, you will earn $13.10 and the person you are matched with will earn $16.60.

You will play 23 Rounds in this Part.

A.3 Quiz on Instructions

PART 1

Suppose in the Round that counts for payment, you faced the following decision problem:

Option 1		Option 2
Fixed amount of $8.30	Versus	Let the computer choose either $4.30 or $20.30

If you picked option 1, which of the following could be your payment (select "yes" or "no" for each)?

- $4.30
- $8.30
- $10.30
- $12.30
- $14.30
- $20.30

If you picked option 2, which of the following could be your payment (select "yes" or "no" for each)?

- $4.30
- $8.30
- $10.30
- $12.30
- $14.30
- $20.30

PART 2

Suppose in the Round that counts for payment, the multiplier is 2 and you have the option to increase or decrease the payment of the person you are matched with.

If you paid \$0, what would be the other person's payment?

If you paid \$1.50, what would be your payment?

If you paid \$1.50, which of the following could you choose for the other person's payment (select "yes" or "no" for each)?

- \$0.00
- \$1.50
- \$3.00
- \$9.10
- \$9.30
- \$10.80
- \$12.30
- \$15.30
- \$16.30

PART 3

Suppose in the Round that counts for payment, the multiplier is 2 and you have the option to increase or decrease the points of the person you are matched with.

If you paid \$0, what would be the other person's payment?

If you paid \$1.50, what would be your payment?

If you paid \$1.50, which of the following could you choose for the other person's points (check all that apply)?

- 0.00 points
- 1.50 points
- 3.00 points
- 9.10 points
- 9.30 points
- 10.80 points
- 12.30 points
- 15.30 points
- 16.30 points

If you paid \$1.50, which of the following could be the other person's **payment** (select "yes" or "no" for each)?

- \$0.00
- \$1.50
- \$3.00
- \$9.10
- \$9.30
- \$10.80
- \$12.30
- \$15.30
- \$16.30

PART 4

Suppose in the Round that counts for payment, you faced the following decision problem:

Option 1	Option 2
Your payment: $14.80 Other's payment: $14.80	Your payment: $16.60 Other's payment: $7.80

If you picked option 1, what would be your payment?

If you picked option 1, what would be the other person's payment?

If you picked option 2, what would be your payment?

If you picked option 2, what would be the other person's payment?

A.4 Survey Questions

How well do the following statements describe your personality?[6]

I see myself as someone who...

is reserved

is generally trusting

tends to be lazy

is relaxed, handles stress well

has few artistic interests

is outgoing, sociable

tends to find fault with others

does a thorough job

gets nervous easily

has an active imagination

For each of the following pairs, please indicate which quality you think is **more important** for a child to have.

It is more important for a child to be...

independent respectful of their elders

obedient self-reliant

considerate well-behaved

curious good-mannered

free-spirited polite

orderly imaginative

adaptable disciplined

loyal open-minded

[6]For each, subjects were given five choices: "Disagree strongly," "Disagree a little," "Neither agree nor disagree," "Agree a little," and "Agree strongly."

What country did you grow up in?

What would best describe you?

- African American
- Asian
- Native American
- White, Latino
- White, not Latino
- Other

What is your biological sex?

- Male
- Female

Do you consider yourself part of the LGBT+ community?

- Yes
- No

What would best describe you?

- Democrat
- Republican
- Independent
- Other

How religious do you consider yourself to be?

- Not at all religious
- A little religious
- Somewhat religious
- Very religious

Which faculty best describes your field of study?

- Science
- Social science
- Arts
- Engineering
- Business
- Other

How much do you spend a month?

- Less than $1,000
- $1,000 to $2,000
- $2,000 to $3,000
- $3,000 to $4,000
- More than $4,000

Have you ever participated in similar experiments before?

- Yes
- No

Was anything confusing?

What do you think the experiment was about?

What motivated your choices in Part 2?

What motivated your choices in Part 3?

What motivated your choices in Part 4?