

Andreas Blume

Curriculum Vitae

January, 2023

Address: Department of Economics, Eller College of Management, McClelland Hall 401, 1130 E. Helen St., Tucson, Arizona 85721-0108

Email: ablume@arizona.edu

Education

University of California, San Diego	Ph.D.	1989	Economics
University of Georgia	M.A.	1984	Economics
University of Bielefeld	Vordiplom	1979	Economics

Positions

McClelland Professor of Economics, University of Arizona, 2012 to present.

Research Fellow - CEPR, 2021 to present.

Faculty Affiliate, Program in Applied Mathematics, University of Arizona, 2019 to present.

Department Head, University of Arizona, January 2015-July 2020.

Professor - Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, 2000-2012.

Associate Professor - Department of Economics, University of Iowa, 1995 to 2000.

Assistant Professor - Department of Economics, University of Iowa, 1989 to 1995.

Visitor - Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld, July 2013 and June 2014

Roger W. Ferguson Jr. and Annette L. Nazareth Member of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, 2011-2012

Guest Researcher - Hausdorff Research Institute for Mathematics (HIM), University of Bonn, Germany, July and August 2009.

Visiting Researcher - University of Bonn, Germany, June 2007 and June 2008.

Visitor-University of Bristol, July 2007 (one week) and July 2008 (two weeks).

Visiting Foreign Scholar, ISER, Osaka University, Japan, May and June 2006.

Visiting Scholar - Boston University, April 2004

Visitor - University of California, San Diego, January 2004

Visiting Associate Professor - Eitan Berglass School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, July 1999.

Visiting Researcher - Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (Social Science Research Center), Germany, August 1998, August 1999, August 2000, June 2001, June 2002, July 2003, May and June 2004, July and August 2005.

Visiting Professor - CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands, Spring 1997.

Visitor - MEDS Department, Northwestern University, Fall 1996.

Visitor - CentER for Economic Research, June and July of 1994.

Grants and Awards

National Science Foundation Grant SES-1258789, “Collaborative Research: Routine Formation in Organizations: Theory and Experimental Evidence,” (joint with John Duffy), Duration: 2013-2015, Amount: \$ 113,409

National Science Foundation Grant SBR-9808947, “Optimal Learning in Games,” Duration: 1998-2001, Amount: \$ 225,473

National Science Foundation Grant SBR-9410588 (joint with Douglas V. DeJong and Yong-Gwan Kim), Title: “Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games,” Duration: 1994-1997, Amount: \$ 210,000

University of Iowa, College of Business Administration, Summer Research Grant, Summers 1990 - 1993.

Alfred P. Sloan Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, Summer 1988 to Summer 1989.

Tuition Scholarship, U.C. San Diego, Fall 1984 to Spring 1988.

Stipend of the DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) for studying at the University of Georgia, Athens, Fall 1981 - Spring 1982.

Sponsorship of NSF Dissertation Grants

Wenhao Wu. Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Should I trust the Mechanic? An Experiment on Bayesian Persuasion, \$6,079. 2018-2019. National Science Foundation, SES-1824353.

Editorial Positions

Advisory Editor - *Games and Economic Behavior* 2013 -

Associate Editor - *European Economic Review* 2003-2007

Member of the Editorial Board - *The B.E. Journals of Theoretical Economics* 2004 - 2013

Publications

Andreas Blume, Ernest K. Lai, and Wooyoung Lim [2023], “Mediated Talk: An Experiment,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, **208**, 105593, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105593>

Andreas Blume, Inga Deimen, and Sean Inoue [2022], “Incomplete Contracts Versus Communication,” *Journal of Economic Theory* **205**, 105544, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105544>

Andreas Blume and In-Uck Park [2022], “Quid pro Quo: Friendly Information Exchange between Rivals,” *Theoretical Economics* **17**, 1183-1223.

Andreas Blume, April Mitchell Franco and Paul Heidhues [2021], “Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines,” *Economic Theory* **72**, 1001-1047

Andreas Blume, Ernest K. Lai and Wooyoung Lim [2020], “Strategic Information Transmission: A Survey of Experiments and Theoretical Foundations,” in C. Monica Capra, Rachel Croson, Mary Rigdon and Tanya Rosenblat (eds), *Handbook of Experimental Game Theory*, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Andreas Blume, Ernest K. Lai and Wooyoung Lim [2019], “Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response,” *Games and Economic Behavior* **113**, 356-380.

Andreas Blume [2018], “Failure of Common Knowledge of Language in Common-Interest Communication Games,” *Games and Economic Behavior* **109**, 132-155.

Andreas Blume, Peter H. Kriss, and Roberto A. Weber [2017] “Pre-Play Communication with Forgone Costly Messages: Experimental Evidence on Forward Induction,” *Experimental Economics* **20**, 368-395.

Kriss, Peter H., Andreas Blume, and Roberto A. Weber [2016] “Coordination with Decentralized Costly Communication,” *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* **130**, 225-241.

Andreas Blume and Oliver Board [2014], “Intentional Vagueness,” *Erkenntnis* **79**, 855-899.

Andreas Blume and Oliver Board [2013], “Language Barriers,” *Econometrica* **81**, 781-812.

Andreas Blume [2012], “A Class of Strategy-Correlated Equilibria in Sender-Receiver Games,” *Games and Economic Behavior* **75**, 510-517.

Andreas Blume, John Duffy and Ted Temzelides [2010], “Self-Organized Criticality in a Dynamic Game,” *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* **34**, 1380-1391.

Andreas Blume and Uri Gneezy [2010], “Cognitive Forward Induction and Coordination without Common Knowledge: An Experimental Study,” *Games and Economic Behavior* **68**, 488-511.

Andreas Blume, John Duffy and April Franco [2009], “Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation,” *American Economic Review* **99**, 1178-1205.

Andreas Blume, Paul Heidhues, Jonathan Lafky, Johannes Münster and Meixia Zhang [2009], “All Equilibria of the Multi-Unit Vickrey Auction,” *Games and Economic Behavior* **66**, 729–741.

Andreas Blume, Douglas V. DeJong, Geoffrey B. Sprinkle [2008], “The Effect of Message Space Size on Learning and Outcomes in Sender-Receiver Games,” *Handbook of Experimental Economics Results* edited by Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith, North-Holland: Amsterdam.

Andreas Blume and Paul Heidhues [2008], “Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions,” *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* (founded as *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*) **164**, 163–184.

Andreas Blume, Oliver Board and Kohei Kawamura [2007], “Noisy Talk,” *Theoretical Economics* **2**, 395–440.

Andreas Blume and April Mitchell Franco [2007], “Decentralized Learning from Failure,” *Journal of Economic Theory* **133**, 504–523.

Andreas Blume and Andreas Ortmann [2007], “The Effects of Costless Pre-play Communication: Experimental Evidence from Games with Pareto-ranked Equilibria,” *Journal of Economic Theory* **132**, 274–290.

Andreas Blume and Paul Heidhues [2006], “Private Monitoring in Auctions,” *Journal of Economic Theory* **131**, 179–211.

Andreas Blume [2005], “A Learning-Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Language,” *Theory and Decision* **57**, 265–285.

Andreas Blume, Douglas V. DeJong and Michael Maier [2005], “Cognition in Spatial Dispersion Games,” in Rami Zwick and Amnon Rapoport (Editors) *Experimental Business Research, Volume III: Marketing, Accounting and Cognitive Perspectives*, Kluwer, Nowell, MA.

Tone Arnold and Andreas Blume [2004], “Learning to Communicate in Cheap-Talk Games,” *Games and Economic Behavior* **46**, 240–259.

Andreas Blume and Paul Heidhues [2004], “All Equilibria of the Vickrey Auction,” *Journal of Economic Theory* **114**, 170–177.

Andreas Blume and Ted Temzelides [2003], “On the Geography of Conventions,” *Economic Theory* **22**, 863–873.

Andreas Blume [2003], “Bertrand Without Fudge,” *Economics Letters* **78**, 167–168.

Andreas Blume, Douglas V. DeJong, George R. Neumann and N.E. Savin [2002], “Learning and Communication in Sender-Receiver Games: An Econometric Investigation,” *Journal of Applied Econometrics* **17**, 225–247.

Andreas Blume, Douglas V. DeJong, Yong-Gwan Kim and Geoffrey B. Sprinkle [2001], “Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest,” *Games and Economic Behavior* **37**, 79–120.

Andreas Blume [2000], “Coordination and Learning with a Partial Language,” *Journal of Economic Theory* **95**, 1–36.

Andreas Blume and Uri Gneezy [2000], “An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games,” *Journal of Economic Theory* **90**, 161–172.

Andreas Blume, Douglas V. DeJong, Yong-Gwan Kim and Geoffrey B. Sprinkle [1998], “Experimental Evidence on the Evolution of Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games,” *American Economic Review* **88**, 1323–1340

Andreas Blume [1998], “Contract Renegotiation with Time-Varying Valuations,” *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy* **7**, 397–433.

Andreas Blume [1998], “Communication, Risk and Efficiency in Games,” *Games and Economic Behavior* **22**, 171–202.

Andreas Blume [1996], “Neighborhood Stability in Sender-Receiver Games,” *Games and Economic Behavior* **13**, 2–25.

Andreas Blume and Joel Sobel [1995], “Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games,” *Journal of Economic Theory* **65**, 359–382.

Andreas Blume [1994], “Equilibrium Refinements in Sender-Receiver Games,” *Journal of Economic Theory* **64**, 66–77.

Andreas Blume [1994], “Intrajay Communication in Repeated Games,” *Games and Economic Behavior* **6**, 181–211.

Andreas Blume, Yong-Gwan Kim and Joel Sobel [1993], “Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication,” *Games and Economic Behavior* **5**, 547–575.

Andreas Blume and Ray Riezman [1993], “Dynamic Tariff Games with Imperfect Observability,” in James W. Friedman (ed.), *Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity*, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Boston.

Book Reviews

Review of *Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection* by Larry Samuelson, in *Artificial Life* **6**, 255–258.

Working Papers

Andreas Blume [2022], “Meaning in Communication Games”

Andreas Blume, Charles Noussair, and Bohan Ye [2021], “Fragile Meaning – An Experiment.”

Andreas Blume [2014], “Language Games.”

Andreas Blume and April Mitchell Franco [2006], “A Decentralized Learning Equilibrium.”

Andreas Blume, Douglas V. DeJong and Michael Maier [2004], “Learning Strategic Sophistication.”

Andreas Blume, Douglas V. DeJong, Aaron Lowen, George R. Neumann and N.E. Savin [2002], “Learning and Experiments: The Bootstrap to the Rescue.”

Andreas Blume and Asher Tishler [1999], “Security Needs and the Performance of the Defense Industry.”

Andreas Blume [2000], “Information Transmission and Preference Similarity.”

Andreas Blume [1994], “Learning, Experimentation, and Long-Run Behavior in Games.”

Andreas Blume and Douglas V. DeJong [1993], “Settlement and Litigation with Multiple Defendants: The Auditor and Manager.”

Andreas Blume [1990], “Bargaining with Randomly Changing Valuations,” University of Iowa.

Andreas Blume [1987], “Renegotiation-Proof Theories in Finite and Infinite Games,” University of California, San Diego.

Professional Service

Referee for *Econometrica*, *Theoretical Economics*, *Journal of Economic Theory*, *American Economic Review*, *Review of Economic Studies*, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *Games and Economic Behavior*, *Journal of Political Economy*, *Rand Journal of Economics*, *Journal of the*

European Economic Association, International Journal of Game Theory, Mathematical Social Sciences, International Economic Review, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Bulletin of Economic Research, American Political Science Review, Experimental Economics, Social Choice and Welfare, Economics Letters, Synthese.

Reviewer for the National Science Foundation, The Israel Science Foundation

Member of the Theoretical and Applied Economics Programme Committee for the 59th European Meeting of the Econometric Society in Madrid, Summer 2004.

Member of the program committee for EC11, the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce in San Jose, California, June 2011

Session organizer for the 15th SAET Conference on Current Trends in Economics, University of Cambridge, UK, July 27-31, 2015

Conferences Organized:

Midwest Mathematical Economics Meetings at the University of Iowa, Spring 1995

Midwest Economic Theory Meetings at the University of Pittsburgh, Fall 2002

Economic Science Association Meetings at the University of Pittsburgh, Summer 2003

Southwest Economic Theory Conference at the University of Arizona, March 28 – 29, 2015

Invited Seminar Presentations:

The University of Georgia (Spring 1990) “Bargaining with Randomly Changing Valuations”; Washington University, St. Louis, MO (Fall 1990) “Intraplay Communication in Repeated Games”; The University of North Carolina, NC (Spring 1993) “Contract Renegotiation with Time-Varying Valuations”; Universität Bonn, Germany (Summer 1994) “Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games”; CentER for Economic Research at the University of Tilburg, Tilburg, The Netherlands, (Summer 1994) “Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games”; Northwestern University (October 1994) “Communication, Risk and Efficiency in Games”; Universität Bielefeld, Germany (Summer 1995) “Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest”; University of Arizona (Fall 1996) “Information Transmission and Preference Similarity”; University of Chicago (Fall 1996) “Information Transmission and Preference Similarity”; Harvard/MIT Economic Theory Seminar (Fall 1996) “Information Transmission and Preference Similarity”; University of Bielefeld (Spring 1997) “Fast Learning in Organizations”; Humboldt University (Berlin) (Spring 1997) “Fast Learning in Organizations”; CenTER for Economic Research (Spring 1997) “Fast Learning in Organizations” and “Information Transmission and Preference Similarity”; University of Saarbrücken (Spring 1997) “Fast Learning in Organizations”; CREED (University of Amsterdam) (Spring 1997) “Fast Learning in Organizations”; University of Wisconsin (Fall 1997) “Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest”; Iowa State University (Fall 1997) “Fast Learning in Organizations;” National University of Ireland - Maynooth (Summer 1998) “Learning in Sender-Receiver Games;” Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) (Summer 1998) “Coordination with a Partial Language”; Arizona State University (Spring 1999) “A Learning-Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Communication”; University of California - San Diego (Spring 1999) “A Learning-Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Communication”; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) (August 1999) “A Learning-Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Communication” and “Security Needs and the Performance of the Defense Industry”; University of Pittsburgh (Fall 1999) “A Learning-Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Communication”; Ohio State University (Spring 2000) “Cognitive Forward Induction and Coordination without Common Knowledge: Theory and Evidence”; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) (August 2000) “Cognitive Forward Induction and Coordination without Common Knowledge: Theory and Evidence”; Harvard University (Fall 2000) “Cognitive Forward Induction and Coordination without Common Knowledge: Theory and Evidence”; Pennsylvania State University (Spring 2001) “Tacit Collusion in Auctions”; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) (June 2001) “Learning from Failure”; Universität Hohenheim - Germany (June 2001) “Cognitive Forward Induction and Coordination without Common Knowledge: Theory and Evidence”; Carnegie Mellon University (October 2001) “Learning Strategic Sophistication”; Virginia Tech (November 2001) “Tacit Collusion in Auctions”; Universität Mannheim (June 2002) “Tacit Collusion in Auctions”; University College London (June 2002) “Tacit Collusion in Auctions”; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) (June 2002) “Learning to Communicate in Cheap-Talk Games”; Universität Bielefeld (July 2003) “Private Monitoring in Auctions”; University of British Columbia (September 2003) “Private Monitoring in Auctions”; University of Texas-Austin (November 2003) “Private Monitoring in Auctions”; University of Wisconsin-Madison (December 2003) “Private Monitoring

in Auctions”; Boston University (March 2004) “A Learning-Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Language”; Michigan State University (November 2004) “Private Monitoring in Auctions”; Universität Bonn (July 2005) “Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation”; UNC/Duke Theory Workshop (November 2005) “Rational Multi-Agent Search”; Johns Hopkins University (November 2005) “Rational Multi-Agent Search”; Osaka University (May 2006) “Noisy Talk”; Kyoto University (June 2006) “Noisy Talk”; University of Missouri (August 2006) “Noisy Talk”; New York University (September 2006) “Noisy Talk”; Northwestern University (October 2006) “Noisy Talk”; University of Arizona (October 2006) “Noisy Talk”; Columbia University (February 2007) “Noisy Talk”; University of Edinburgh (February 2007) “Noisy Talk”; University of Central Florida (March 2007) “Noisy Talk”; University of Bonn (May 2007) “Noisy Talk”; University of Bielefeld (May 2007) “Noisy Talk”; University of Bristol (June 2007) “Noisy Talk”; University of California–San Diego (February 2008) “Normal Talk”; Texas A&M University (April 2008) “Intentional Vagueness”; Universität Hannover (June 2008) “Intentional Vagueness”; Universität Bonn (June 2008) “Intentional Vagueness”; University of Arizona (September 2009) “Intentional Vagueness”; University of California - San Diego (November 2009) “Intentional Vagueness”; University of California - Riverside (November 2009) “Intentional Vagueness”; University of California - Los Angeles (November 2009) “Intentional Vagueness”; University of California - Davis (November 2009) “Intentional Vagueness”; Hausdorff Research Institute for Mathematics - University of Bonn (June 2009) “Language Barriers”; University of Toronto (October 2009) “Language Barriers”; University of Texas-Austin (November 2009) “Language Barriers”; Carnegie Mellon University (March 2010) “Privately Known Message Costs;” University of Western Ontario (September 2010) “Language Barriers”; University of Maastricht (November 2010) “Language Barriers”; University of Bielefeld (November 2010) “Language Barriers”; European University Institute (January 2011) “Language Barriers”; Harvard/MIT Theory Seminar (February 2011) “Language Barriers”; Arizona State University (March 2011) “Language Barriers”; MIT/Sloan Seminar in Organizational Economics (April 2011) “Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines”; Boston College (April 2011) “Language Barriers”; Paris School of Economics (May 2011) “Language Barriers”; HEC Paris (May 2011) “Language Barriers”; Princeton University (September 2011) “Language Barriers”; Rutgers University (April 2012) “Language Barriers”; Simon Fraser University (April 2013) “Common Knowledge of Language and Communication Success”; Universität Bielefeld (July 2013) “Common Knowledge of Language and Communication Success”; University of British Columbia (September 2013) “Common Knowledge of Language and Communication Success”; University of Southern California (October 2013) “Common Knowledge of Language and Communication Success”; Tel Aviv University (December 2013) “Higher-Order Uncertainty About Language”; University of California - Irvine, Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences (January 2014) “Higher-Order Uncertainty About Language”; University of California - San Diego, Linguistics Department (January 2014) “Higher-Order Uncertainty About Language”; Rice University (February 2014) “Higher-Order Uncertainty About Language”; Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (August 2014) “Higher-Order Uncertainty About Language”; Chinese University of Hong Kong (August 2014) “Language Games”; Loyola Marymount University (March 2015) “Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response”; Columbia University (September 2015) “Language Games”; New York University (October 2015) “Language Games”; University of California – Irvine (June 2016),

“Failure of Common Knowledge of Language in Common-Interest Communication Games”; Washington University – St. Louis (October 2016), “Failure of Common Knowledge of Language in Common-Interest Communication Games”; Concordia University (October 2016), “Failure of Common Knowledge of Language in Common-Interest Communication Games”; University of California – Irvine, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science (May 2017), “Erosion of Meaning – An Experiment”; University of California – Merced, Cognitive and Information Sciences (September 2017), “Failure of Common Knowledge of Language in Common-Interest Communication Games”; University of Calgary (March 2019) “Mediated Talk: An Experiment”; Virtual East Asia Experimental and Behavioral Economics Seminar Series (October 2020) “Mediated Talk: An Experiment”; University of Arizona (IBE Theory Brown Bag) (October 2021) “Meaning in Communication Games”; University of California – Riverside (October 2021) “Meaning in Communication Games”; New York University (April 2022) “Mediated Talk: An Experiment”.

Contributed Conference Presentations:

Conference on Dynamics and Cooperation in Games, Northwestern University (Summer 1992) “Equilibrium Refinements in Sender-Receiver Games.”

Mathematical Economics Meetings: University of Indiana (Spring 1990) “Bargaining with Randomly Changing Valuations”; University of Illinois (Fall 1990) “Intraplay Communication in Repeated Games”; IUPUI (Fall 1991) “Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games”; Michigan State University (Spring 1992) “Equilibrium Refinements in Sender-Receiver Games”; University of Pittsburgh (Fall 1992) “Settlement and Litigation with Multiple Defendants: The Auditor and Manager”; University of Kentucky (Spring 1993) “Contract Renegotiation with Time-Varying Valuations”; University of Michigan (Spring 1994) “Communication, Risk and Efficiency in Games”; University of Indiana (Fall 1997) “Fast Learning in Organizations”; Purdue University (Spring 1999) “A Learning-Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Communication”; Georgetown University (Fall 1999) “Learning to Communicate in Cheap-Talk Games”; Northwestern University (Spring 2002) “Learning from Failure.”

Econometric Society Meetings: World Congress in Barcelona (1990) “Bargaining with Randomly Changing Valuations”; Winter Meetings in Washington, D.C. (1990) “Bargaining with Randomly Changing Valuations”; Summer Meetings at the University of Pennsylvania (1991) “Intraplay Communication in Repeated Games”; Winter Meetings in Washington, D.C. (1995) “Communication, Risk and Efficiency in Games”; Summer Meetings at the University of Maryland (2001) “Cognitive Forward Induction and Coordination without Common Knowledge”; World Congress in London (2005) “Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation”; World Congress in Shanghai (2010) “Language Barriers”; Winter Meetings in Philadelphia (2014) “Higher-Order Uncertainty About Language”; World Congress in Montreal (2015) “Language Games”; ESA-ESEM at Bocconi University (expected 2022).

International Conference on Game Theory at Stony Brook: (1990) “Bargaining with Randomly

Changing Valuations”; (1991) “Intraplay Communication in Repeated Games”; (1992) “Equilibrium Refinements in Sender-Receiver Games”; (1993) “Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication”; (1996) “Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games”; (2010) “Language Barriers”.

Economic Science Association Meetings, Long Beach (Spring 1995) “Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games”; Tucson (Fall 1998) “An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games”; Lake Tahoe (Spring 1999) “Inferring Learning Rules from Experimental Game Data;” Pittsburgh (Summer 2003) “Learning Strategic Sophistication”; Santa Cruz (Fall 2013) “Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response.”

Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, International Conference, Antalya, Turkey (June 1997) “Fast Learning in Organizations”; Rhodes, Greece (July 2003) “Private Monitoring in Auctions;” Vigo, Spain (July 2005) “Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation”; Tokyo, Japan (August 2014) “Higher-Order Uncertainty about Language”; Ischia, Italy (July 2019) “Mediated Talk: An Experiment”

Game Theory Society: Second World Congress (Marseille 2004) “Decentralized Learning From Failure”; Third World Congress (Evanston 2008) “Intentional Vagueness”; Second Brazilian Workshop (São Paulo 2010) “Language Barriers”; Fifth World Congress (Maastricht 2016) “Failure of Common Knowledge of Language in Common-Interest Communication Games”; 6th World Congress (Budapest 2021) “Mediated Talk: An Experiment”

Canadian Economic Theory Meetings, Toronto (May 2002), “Tacit Collusion in Auctions”

New and Alternative Directions for Learning Workshop, Carnegie Mellon University (August 2004), “Cognition in Spatial Dispersion Games”

NSF/CEME Decentralization Conference (March 2011), “Language Barriers”

Deception, Incentives & Behavior Conference, UC San Diego (April 2012), “A Game Theoretic Approach to Randomized Response: Theory and Experiments”

Southwest Economic Theory (SWET) conference, Honolulu (March 2013), “Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines”; Santa Barbara (February 2019), “Mediated Talk: An Experiment”; University of California, San Diego (February 2020), “Erosion of Meaning: An Experiment”

4th annual Southwest Experimental and Behavioral Economics Workshop (SWEBE) at Claremont Graduate University (May 2019), “Mediated Talk: An Experiment”

Santa Barbara Conference on Experimental and Behavioral Economics (January 2020), “Erosion of Meaning: An Experiment”

Invited Conference Presentations

Summer Meeting at the University of València, València, Spain (Summer 1998) “Coordination and Learning with a Partial Language.”

Summer in Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv University (Summer 1999) “A Learning-Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Communication.”

Conference on *Collusion and Cartels*, WZB, Berlin, Germany (October 2004), “Private Monitoring in Auctions.”

Urrutia Elejalde Workshop on Economics and Philosophy, Conference on *Economics and Language*, Madrid, Spain (June 2006), “Noisy Talk.”

26th Arne Ryde Symposium, *Communication in Games and Experiments*, Lund, Sweden (24-25 August 2007), “Noisy Talk”.

Workshop on Communication, Game Theory, and Language, Northwestern University (September 7–8, 2007), “Noisy Talk.” (Both Prof. Board and I were invited and attended; he presented the paper.)

Conference on *Individual Decisions and Political Process*, CIRANO Experimental Laboratory, Montreal, Canada (October 17-18, 2008)

Workshop on *Decentralized Mechanism Design, Distributed Computing, and Cryptography* sponsored by the Institute for Advanced Study and DIMACS, Princeton (June 3-4, 2010)

19th Annual Conference of the WZB (Social Science Center Berlin) on Markets and Politics—Cheap Talk and Signaling (June 17-18, 2011), “Language Barriers.”

Workshop on Bounded Rationality Models in Economics, Stony Brook (July 17-18, 2011), “Language Barriers.”

LABEL Experimental Economics Conference, University of Southern California, Los Angeles (May 30 and 31) “Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response.”

Workshop on Knightian Uncertainty and Robustness in Games, IMW, Bielefeld, Germany (June 12 and 13, 2014), “Language Games.”

23rd European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory (ESSET) at the Study Center Gerzensee, Switzerland (June 30 – July 11, 2014), “Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response.”

The 5th Annual Xiamen University International Workshop on Experimental Economics, Xiamen University, China (December 13 and 14, 2014), “Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response.” (Keynote Speaker)

Morality, Incentives and Unethical Behavior Conference, University of California - San Diego (March 12 –14, 2015), “Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response.”

24rd European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory (ESSET) at the Study Center Gerzensee, Switzerland (June 29 – July 10, 2015), “Quid pro Quo: Friendly Information Exchange between Rivals.”

The 30th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association at the University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany (August 24 – August 27, 2015), “Language Games.”

25th European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory (ESSET) at the Study Center Gerzensee, Switzerland (July 4 – July 15, 2016), “Failure of Common Knowledge of Language in Common-Interest Communication Games.”

26th European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory (ESSET) at the Study Center Gerzensee, Switzerland (July 3 – July 14, 2017), “Erosion of Meaning – An Experiment.”

UCSD Theory Foundations Conference, University of California - San Diego (January, 2020), “Information Processing: Contracts versus Communication.”

31st Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory (July 2020), “Information Processing: Contracts Versus Communication.”

Workshop on Signaling in Social Interactions: A Multidisciplinary Approach, Paris, University Panthéon-Assas, France (June 8-9, 2022), “Meaning in Communication Games.”

Asia Pacific regional meeting of the Economic Science Association, Seoul National University, South Korea (May 19 – 21, 2023, expected), paper TBD. (keynote speaker)

Workshop on Applications of Game Theory in the Study of Language: Paris, University Panthéon-Assas, France (June 15-16, 2023, expected), Paper TBD

30th European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory (ESSET) at the Study Center Gerzensee, Switzerland (July 3 – July 14, 2023, expected), “Meaning in Communication Games.”

Mini Courses

“Language and Strategy,” two weeks, University of Arizona, September 2008

“Language and Strategy,” two weeks, University of California - San Diego, October - November 2008

“Communication in Economics,” one week, European School of Management and Technology, Berlin - Germany, August 2011

“Language in Communication Games” one week, Bielefeld Graduate School of Economics and Management, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld - Germany, July 2013

Honors Thesis Advising

Sylvia Christine Zarnescu, 2022

Ph.D. Advising

Subhashish Gupta, committee member, graduated 1992, first appointment at University College of Swansea, UK.

Bill Zexu Yang, committee member, graduated 1993, first appointment at Flinders University, Australia.

Pingui Xiang, committee member, graduated 1993, first appointment at Northern State University.

Jeon Hun Oh, committee member, graduated 1995, returned to Korea after graduation.

Ying Yan, committee member, graduated 1996, first appointment at KeyCorp.

Mehmet Yasici, committee member, graduated 1996, returned to Turkey after graduation.

Gabriele Camera, committee member, graduated 1997, first appointment at Purdue University.

Tatiana Kornienko, committee member, degree awarded in 2001, first appointment at University of Winnipeg.

Vasiliki Skreta, committee member, degree awarded in 2002, first appointment at University of Minnesota.

Sudeep Gosh, supervisor, degree awarded in 2003, City University of Hong Kong.

Aaron Lowen, supervisor, degree awarded in 2003, Grand Valley State University.

Zhiyong Tu, supervisor, degree awarded in 2005, Graduate School of Business, Peking University.

Cagri Kumru, committee member, degree awarded in 2006, first appointment at Celal Bayar University, Manisa, Turkey.

Virginie Masson, committee member, degree awarded 2006, first appointment at the University of Adelaide.

Hadi Yektas, supervisor, degree awarded in 2006, first appointment at University of Guelph, Canada.

Yong Sui, supervisor, 2007, first appointment at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China.

Georgios Katsenos, supervisor, 2007, first appointment at the Leibniz Universität Hannover, Germany.

Huan Xie, supervisor (co-chair), 2008, first appointment at Concordia University, Canada.

Ana Espinola Arredondo, supervisor, 2008, first appointment at Washington State University, Pullman.

Felix Munoz-Garcia, committee member, 2008, first appointment at Washington State University, Pullman.

Helen Lafferty, supervisor, August 2009, first appointment at the US Department of Justice.

Ernest Kong-Wah Lai, supervisor, June 2009, first appointment at Lehigh University.

Morimitsu Kurino, co-chair, August 2009, first appointment at Max-Planck Institute of Economics (Jena), Post-doctoral Research Fellow

Carlos Caicedo, external committee member, July 2009, first appointment at the Syracuse University School of Information Studies

Yeolyong Sung, supervisor, July 2010, Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET)

Jonathan Lafky, committee member, June 2010, first appointment at Lafayette College

Wooyoung Lim, supervisor, April 2010, first appointment at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Sun-Tak Kim, committee member, May 2012, first appointment at National Taiwan University

Peter Kriss, committee member, May 2012, first appointment at Medallia, Inc., Palo Alto, CA

Yun Wang, supervisor (co-chair), June 2013, first appointment at Xiamen University

Lindsey Nagy, committee member, June 2013, first appointment at Muhlenberg College

David Rietzke, committee member, June 2014, first appointment at Lancaster University

Christoph Diehl, external committee member, Universität Bielefeld, June 2014

Timothy Flannery, supervisor, Eastern Connecticut State University, May 2015

James Fisher, committee member, postdoc at the University of Technology, Sydney, March 2015

Quyen Nguyen, supervisor, Utah State University, July 2016

Daehong Min, supervisor, KISDI (Korea Information Society Development Institute), May 2017

Devdeepa Bose, committee member, postdoc at California Institute of Technology, May 2018

Sean Inoue, supervisor, visiting assistant professor at Louisiana State University, May 2019

Maxwell Rosenthal, supervisor (co-chair), Georgia Institute of Technology, May 2019

Senran Lin, committee member, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE), May 2020

Bohan Ye, committee member, University of Southern Indiana, May 2020

Wenhao Wu, supervisor, ShanghaiTech University, May 2020

Rachel Mannahan, committee member, Tennessee Tech, May 2022