Arash Roghani

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Education

University of Arizona, Eller College of Business

Ph.D. Candidate in Marketing with Economics Minor, Expected: May 2025

Dissertation Title: Essays in Information, Disclosure, and Search (proposal defended)

Committee: Mrinal Ghosh (chair), Yong Liu, Inga Deimen (Economics), and Anthony Dukes (USC)

University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business

Master of Science in Business Research, Marketing

Sharif University of Technology

Master of Business Administration

BS in Civil Engineering

Research Interests

Substantive: Informative Advertising, Online Reviews, Digital Platforms

Theoretical: Information Disclosure, Consumer Search, Marketing Channels

Methodological: Analytical Modelling, Experiments

Research

Roghani, Arash and Ghosh, Mrinal (2024), "Upstream Competition and Manufacturer Disclosure Strategies", under review at *Marketing Science*.

Roghani, Arash and Dukes, Anthony (2024), "Product Comparison Tools: Marketing a Competitor's Product", targeted to *Marketing Science*. **(Job Market Paper)**

Research in Progress:

"SummarAIze: Substitutability and Complementarity of Online Reviews and Their Generative AI Summaries", with Mrinal Ghosh, Anuj Kapoor, and Adrija Majumdar, targeted to the *Journal of Marketing Research*.

Winner of Lundgren Retail Collaborative Research Grant, 2024
Winner of the Graduate and Professional Student Council (GPSC) Research Grant, 2024

"Customer Accessibility and After-Sales Service Competition", with Mrinal Ghosh and Tirthankar Roy

Conference Presentations and Invited Talks

"Upstream Competition and Manufacturer Disclosure Strategies"
ISBM Academic Conference, Penn State, June 2024
Arizona Quantitative Marketing Research Group, March 2024
ISMS Informs Marketing Science Conference, Miami, June 2023
George John Symposium, Austin, May 2023
The University of Nebraska-Lincoln Symposium, March 2023

"Product Comparison Tools: Marketing a Competitor's Product"

Arizona Marketing Proseminar, April 2024, September 2024

Honors and Awards

Lundgren Retail Collaborative Research Grant, 2024 ($2000)
For "SummarAIze: Substitutability and Complementarity of Online Reviews and Their Generative AI Summaries."
Graduate and Professional Student Council (GPSC) Research Grant, 2024 ($1500)
For "SummarAIze: Substitutability and Complementarity of Online Reviews and Their Generative AI Summaries."
Arizona Summer Research Award, 2022, 2023, 2024 ($9000 total)
ISMS Doctoral Consortium Fellow, 2023

Teaching Experience

MKTG 376, Instructor, *Marketing Analytics*, Fall 2023 (Rating: 4.4/5)
In this lecture-based course, students gained practical skills in using Excel to extract marketing insights for decision-making. The curriculum included topics such as descriptive statistics; hypothesis testing; linear, log-based, and logistic regression models; cluster analysis; conjoint analysis; market response models; and pricing.

MKTG 471, Instructor, *Marketing Policies and Operations*, Summer 2023 (Rating: 4.4/5)
This lecture-based capstone course for senior undergraduate students covers diverse aspects of evaluating and implementing a comprehensive *marketing strategy*. The course was organized around class discussions on recent Harvard Business Review case studies, fostering critical

thinking in an inclusive environment to empower students in making and analyzing practical decisions.

MKTG 376, TA of Dr. Xinying Hao, *Marketing Analytics*, Spring 2023, Fall 2024

Selected Graduate-Level Courses

University of Arizona

Marketing Theory I, Conceptual Foundations in CB Research, Martin Reimann
Marketing Theory II, Contributions in Quantitative Marketing, Yong Liu
Measurement and Validity, Mrinal Ghosh
Models of Information Asymmetry, Mrinal Ghosh
Analytical Models, Yong Liu
Experimental Research, Jennifer Savary
Consumer Judgement and Decision Making, Anastasiya Ghosh
Consumer Culture Theory, Melanie Wallendorf
Academic Writing, Caleb Warren
Microeconomics III, Inga Deimen
Experimental Economics, Charles Noussair
Industrial Organizations and Regulations I, Stanley Reynolds

University of Southern California

Marketing Models, Anthony Dukes and Lan Luo
Advanced Quantitative Models in Marketing, Dina Mayzlin and Sha Yang
Consumer Behavior Theory and Research, Joe Nunes
Strategy and Marketing Mix Models, S. Siddarth and Gerrard Tellis
Selected Issues in Economic Theory I, Anthony Marino
Selected Issues in Economic Theory II, Joao Ramos
Probability and Statistics for Economists, Geert Ridder
Econometric Methods, Roger Moon
Game Theory, Fanny Camara
Industrial Organizations, Guofu Tan
Empirical Industrial Organizations, Yu-Wei Hsieh

Relevant Skills

Programming: Mathematica, SPSS, Stata, R, z-Tree
Language: Persian (native), English (professional Proficiency)

References

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Research Overview

"Upstream Competition and Manufacturer Quality Disclosure Strategy"

Contrary to the classic literature on voluntary quality disclosure, which suggests that manufacturers of all quality levels should voluntarily disclose their private quality information to buyers, recent theoretical advances indicate that mechanisms such as vertical channel interactions might lead manufacturers to avoid disclosing high-quality levels. In contrast, empirical evidence and anecdotal observations show that many firms do disclose the high-quality levels of their products. This paper addresses this discrepancy by providing a theoretical explanation that demonstrates how variation in supplier-level competition influences manufacturers' incentives to disclose quality. Compared to a monopolist supplier scenario, we find that high competition between suppliers leads to a full disclosure equilibrium, where manufacturers of all quality levels disclose quality. Crucially, when supplier competition is imperfect, either due to unequal costs or horizontally differentiated components, a partial disclosure equilibrium emerges, where manufacturers disclose high and medium-low quality levels but avoid disclosing low and medium-high quality levels. Additionally, we identify conditions under which different channel instruments, such as side payments and pre-commitment to wholesale prices, can encourage manufacturers to disclose quality, thereby improving system profits. Our analysis also challenges previous analytical predictions about the positive effect of upstream competition on channel efficiency.

"Product Comparison Tools: Marketing a Competitor's Product"

Some firms design their websites with comparison tools that make it easy for consumers to objectively compare their product attributes to competitors'. This seemingly counterintuitive practice can reveal a firm's inferiority in certain attributes, potentially leading to customer loss. This research provides a rationale for this strategy and explores conditions when it is profitable. We argue that comparison tools are a means for the marketer to reduce search frictions and make it easier for its customers to learn whether the rival product is a better fit. This reduces the price elasticity of the

rival's demand, thereby relaxing price competition. Comparison tools are mutually profitable for competitors of similar qualities but not for a seller with a considerable quality advantage. Comparison by a higher-quality product is more likely to be profitable if it is more familiar to consumers or if consumer search costs are higher.

"SummarAIze: Substitutability and Complementarity of Online Reviews and Their Generative AI Summaries"

Online reviews have been crucial resources for understanding product attributes based on the experiences of past consumers; however, consumer search in online reviews encounters two primary challenges: the presence of noise from fake reviews and the escalating search costs due to the increasing volume of reviews over time. To address these issues, Amazon, Microsoft, and Newegg have recently started the practice of offering generative AI (GenAI) text, based on online reviews. These summaries do not just condense information, but by providing access to the reviews related to the frequently mentioned attributes, they may induce more search for consumers who would skip searching online reviews otherwise. Additionally, to generate the text, firms can choose whether to consider all reviews or merely rely on those less likely to be fake, navigating a tradeoff between informativeness and accuracy of the provided text. In this research, we will investigate whether these summaries act as substitutes or complements to consumer search in online reviews. Through analytical modeling, experiments on MTurk, and a field experiment by developing our own website, we explore i) the effect of GenAI summaries on consumer purchase and review posting behavior and ii) firms optimal decision about the tradeoff between informativeness and accuracy of the GenAI summaries.

"Customer Accessibility and After-Sales Service Competition"

Durable goods require scheduled maintenance services to realize their productive value and enjoy warranty protection. Oftentimes, customers can choose between authorized providers and independent providers for after-sales services. A critical feature of this market is that despite a wide choice of maintenance service providers, the authorized provider, by virtue of having access to customer purchase information of the product, has an inherent advantage over the independent providers in their ability to identify and access customers who purchased the durable good and hence are in the market for maintenance services. This information asymmetry in accessing customers is further cemented by federal legislations like the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) and related state-level legislations, which imposes restrictions on the sale of consumer information (e.g., vehicle registration, name, VIN, and other driver license related information) to third parties for marketing purposes. In this research, we model competition between authorized and independent providers in the maintenance service markets to study the impact of this asymmetry in customer accessibility on the pricing and promotion decisions of the competing parties. We are currently developing an analytical model and intend to test its predictions using primary data on service offerings and prices offered by dealers and non-dealers.