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Major Fields of Concentration

Labor Economics, Macroeconomics, Econometrics, Computational Economics

Education

PhD	Economics	University of Arizona	2025 (expected)
		University of Minnesota (visiting)	2023
MA	Economics	University of Tokyo	2018
BA	Economics	Central University of Finance and Economics	2016

Dissertation

Title: "Essays on Labor Economics"
Dissertation Advisor(s): Professor Hidehiko Ichimura and Professor Juan Pantano
Completion: Spring 2025

References

Professor Hidehiko Ichimura   (520) 621-6251
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                                                          Department of Economics
                                                          New York University
Professor Thomas J. Sargent   (212) 998-3548   6th Floor
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Honors and Awards

2021   *Ed Zajac Best Third Year Paper Honorable Mentions,* Department of Economics,
            University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona.
2020   *Steve Manos Best Second Year Paper,* Department of Economics, University of Arizona,
            Tucson, Arizona.
2016-2018   *UTokyo International Scholar Fellowship*, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
2016   *Best Bachelor Thesis,* China Economics and Management Academy,
            Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, China
2015   *Academic Excellence* China Economics and Management Academy,
            Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, China

Teaching Experience

Spring 2024   *Teaching Assistant/Co-teaching,* University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona.
               "Computational Methods and Dynamic Models in Economics", with Professor Juan Pantano
Spring 2023/4 *Teaching Assistant/Co-teaching,* Peking University HSBC Business School, Shenzhen,
               China. "Advanced Quant Econ and Fin with Python", with Professor Thomas J. Sargent
Spring 2019   *Teaching Assistant,* University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona.
               "Econometrics II", with Professor Hidehiko Ichimura
Fall 2017   *Teaching Assistant,* University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan.
               "Econometrics II", with Professor Hidehiko Ichimura

Research Experience

2019-2021   *Lead Developer,* QuantEcon
2019-2020   *Research Assistant,* Peking University HSBC Business School, Shenzhen, China.
            Research assistant for Professor Thomas J. Sargent
2017-2019   *Research Assistant,* University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan.
            Research assistant for Professor Hidehiko Ichimura.

Working Papers

"Understanding the Evolution of Labor and Marriage Markets from 1968 to 2018", job market paper.
"Model-Aided Identification of Policy Effects Using RCTs", with Sebestian Galiani and Juan Pantano
"Bride Competition in Marriage Markets with Open Borders", with Wanchuan Lin, Juan Pantano, and Yin-chi Wang
"I Marry as You Marry: Rational Herding in the Marriage Market"
"The Price of Time: Optimal Time Allocation among Labor and Marriage Markets"

Work in Progress

"Connected Equilibrium Transitions with Sequential Shocks"
"Propagation through the Fundamental Surplus", with Lars Ljungqvist, Andrea Papetti, and Thomas J. Sargent
"Nonparametric Identification of Discrete-Continuous Choice Models using Panel Data"

Publication

"QuantEcon.py: A community-based Python library for quantitative economics", with Quentin Batista, et al.
 Journal of Open Source Software, 2023

Computer Skills

Python, Julia, Matlab, Fortran, Stata

Languages

Chinese (Native), English (Fluent), Japanese (Fluent), Spanish (Basic)

Selected Abstract(s)

"Understanding the Evolution of Labor and Marriage Markets from 1968 to 2018," job market paper

This paper examines how changes in wage structure and divorce laws in the United States influenced labor and marriage market outcomes from 1968 to 2018. We develop a general equilibrium overlapping generations model that incorporates female labor supply, education, and marital choices to analyze the impacts of rising college premiums, narrowing gender wage gaps, increasing wage volatility, and the shift from mutual consent to unilateral divorce regimes. We model both endogenous labor and marriage markets and allow for rich interactions between the two markets during the transition. To exploit both the rich empirical dynamics and the variation in state-level divorce law changes, we propose an innovative methodology and estimate the model by fitting connected equilibrium transitional paths to time-series data. This approach allows us to disentangle the effects of sequential exogenous driving forces. Our decomposition analysis reveals that the increasing college premium was the primary driver of delayed marriage and increasing high educational attainment, while divorce law reforms partially offset this trend. Before the 1990s, the returns from the marriage market predominantly incentivized higher education, while labor market returns became the key motivator for educational advancement thereafter.

"Model-Aided Identification of Policy Effects Using RCTs,"
 with Sebastian Galiani and Juan Pantano

This paper estimates a dynamic discrete choice model to analyze how cash transfers affect schooling and marriage decisions among teenage girls in low-income countries. We focus on a two-year duration cash transfer program implemented in Malawi among school-age girls, and the model is estimated to fit policy effects on encouraging school attendance and delaying marriage. We use data of control group and unconditional cash transfers group for estimation, and reserve the conditional cash transfers group for out-of-sample validation. With the aid of the estimated structural model, we address the dynamic selection issue stemming from recruitment eligibility requirements (unmarried, in-school girls) in the presence of unobservable heterogeneity in household preferences for girls' schooling, and unveil the full policy effects by accounting for the impacts on the ineligible girls who would have chosen to stay unmarried and in-school with the cash transfers. We also use the model to simulate policy effects with the hypothetical longer duration cash transfers. The synergies between RCTs and fully specified, estimable structural models provide us convincing model identification and validation, as well as more reliable extrapolation of important policy effects.

"Equilibrium Effects of Bride Competition in Marriage Markets with Open Borders",
 with Wanchuan Lin, Juan Pantano, and Yin-Chi Wang

We examine the effects of marriage market competition when these markets allow participants from outside their traditional borders. Increased globalization has led to increased linkages across marriage markets that were autarkic for most human history. We examine the case of Taiwan, which in 1992 relaxed its immigration proceedings leading to an unprecedented surge of marriages between local Taiwanese men and mostly Asian, non-Taiwanese women who moved to Taiwan for the purpose of marriage. To understand the impacts of such a shock, we estimate a dynamic equilibrium model of the marriage market an investigate the impact of increased competition by non-local brides in a marriage market that opens up beyond its traditional boundaries.