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Moritz Janas, Postdoctoral Researcher, NYU Abu Dhabi
Eliciting thresholds for collective behavior
Authors: Moritz Janas, Nikos Nikiforakis, Simon Siegenthaler
Abstract: Threshold models have a long tradition in studying collective behavior and social coordination. An individual's threshold corresponds to the share of society members who must exhibit a behavior before the individual adopts the same behavior. We present a theoretical framework for how an individual's preferences, conformity, and expected social sanctions determine her threshold. We test the derived hypotheses by introducing an incentive-compatible method for eliciting thresholds and applying it to the context of affirmative action in a large sample of the US population. The results demonstrate how race/ethnicity, gender, conformity, reference groups, status quo bias, and other variables change threshold distributions. Using the model, we show that the social interdependence created by conformity leads to significant potential for social tipping points. Additionally, for many social groups, equilibrium outcomes that account for thresholds differ substantially from the average preferences. We conclude with counterfactual analyses to identify effective policy interventions for promoting norm change.