Inga Deimen

Inga Deimen joined the University of Arizona in 2017. She earned her PhD in Economics from the University of Bonn. Her research is in microeconomic theory and organizational economics, and her current interests focus on communication and beliefs. She combines strategic information transmission with contracts or endogenous information, and compares it to delegation. Moreover, she studies optimal beliefs and how beliefs about subgroups impact welfare. 

Courses

• ECON 503B Microeconomic Theory 
• ECON 431/531 Games and Decisions
• ECON 519 Mathematical Economics
• ECON 501C Microeconomic Theory
• ECON 696U Game Theory

Publications

• Deimen, Inga. 2025. “Authority and Information in Multi-divisional Organizations” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, ewaf021.
• Deimen, Inga, and Dezso Szalay. 2024. “Communication in the Shadow of Catastrophe.” Journal of Economic Theory, 222.
• Andreas Blume, Inga Deimen, and Sean Inoue. 2022. ''Incomplete Contracts versus Communication.'' Journal of Economic Theory, 205.
• Inga Deimen and Julia Wirtz. 2022. ''Control, cost, and confidence: perseverance and procrastination in the face of failure.'' Games and Economic Behavior, 134: 52-74.
• Inga Deimen and Dezso Szalay. 2019. "Delegated Expertise, Authority, and Communication." American Economic Review, 109 (4): 1349-74.
• Inga Deimen and Dezso Szalay. 2019. "Information and Communication in Organizations." AEA Papers and Proceedings, 109: 545-49.
• Inga Deimen, Felix Ketelaar, and Mark T. Le Quement. 2015. "Consistency and Communication in Committees." Journal of Economic Theory, 160: 24-35.