Andreas Blume

Economics Department Head

McClelland Professor of Economics

Andreas Blume

McClelland Hall 401M
1130 East Helen Street 
P.O. Box 210108 
Tucson, Arizona 85721-0108 

Areas of Expertise

  • Game theory
  • Microeconomics


PhD in Economics, University of California, San Diego, 1989

Andreas Blume joined the Eller College of Management in 2012. Prior to joining Eller, he taught at the University of Iowa and the University of Pittsburgh. He earned his PhD in Economics from the University of California-San Diego in 1989. He was appointed department head at Eller in 2015. His current research focus is on using game theoretic and experimental methods to study strategic communication with imperfectly shared languages, through noisy channels, with costly messages and on organizational coordination in environments with limited or no communication.


  • ECON 696U Game Theory
  • ECON 501C Micro Theory III
  • ECON 431 Games and Decisions

Recent Publications

  • "Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response," (2018) Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming. (with Ernest K. Lai and Wooyoung Lim)
  • "Failure of Common Knowledge of Language in Common-Interest Communication Games," (2018) Games and Economic Behavior, 109, 132-155.
  • "Pre-Play Communication with Forgone Costly Messages: Experimental Evidence on Forward Induction," (2017) Experimental Economics, 20, 368-395. (with Peter H. Kriss, and Roberto A. Weber)
  • "Coordination with Decentralized Costly Communication," (2016) Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 130, 225-241. (with Peter H. Kriss and Roberto A. Weber)
  • "Intentional Vagueness," (2104) Erkenntnis, 79, 855-899. (with Oliver Board)
  • "Language Barriers," (2013) Econometrica, 81, 781-812. (with Oliver Board)

Other Selected Publications

  • “A Class of Strategy-Correlated Equilibria in Sender-Receiver Games,” (2012) Games and Economic Behavior 75, 510-517.
  • “Cognitive Forward Induction and Coordination without Common Knowledge: An Experimental Study,” (2010) Games and Economic Behavior, 68, 488-511. (with Uri Gneezy)
  • “Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation,” (2009) American Economic Review, 99, 1178-1205. (with John Duffy and April Franco)
  • “Noisy Talk,” (2007) Theoretical Economics, 2, 395–440. (with Oliver Board)
  • “All Equilibria of the Multi-Unit Vickrey Auction,” (2009) Games and Economic Behavior, 66, 729–741. (with Paul Heidhues, Jonathan Lafky, Johannes Münster and Meixia Zhang)
  • “The Effects of Costless Pre-play Communication: Experimental Evidence from Games with Pareto-ranked Equilibria,” (2007) Journal of Economic Theory, 132, 274–290. ( with Andreas Ortmann)
  • “Private Monitoring in Auctions,” (2006) Journal of Economic Theory,131, 179–211. (with Paul Heidhues)
  • “A Learning-Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Language,” (2005) Theory and Decision, 57, 265–285.
  • “Coordination and Learning with a Partial Language,”  (2000) Journal of Economic Theory, 95, 1–36.
  • “Experimental Evidence on the Evolution of Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games,” (1998) American Economic Review, 88, 1323–1340 (with Douglas V. DeJong, Yong-Gwan Kim and Geoffrey B. Sprinkle)